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Abstract: The U.S. Constitution importantly limits the degree to which the federal government 
can impose harmonization across member states. This paper reviews these limitations and 
how they have evolved substantially over time in the U.S. It also discusses some of the 
benefits and costs of such limitations, and argues that the EU may benefit from adopting 
similar limitations. Harmonization of EU tax codes is likely to be economically harmful. On 
theoretical grounds, tax rates are likely to be harmonized at a common rate that is higher than 
optimal for the EU. This suggests the benefits of constitutional provisions that make tax 
harmonization difficult to impose. Other types of harmonization have a less clear-cut cost-
benefit analysis. A federal commercial code that is uniform across member states reduces 
transaction and information costs, compared to leaving important code issues to member 
states; further, many states may keep codes for long periods that are sub-optimal compared to 
a given federal code. A federal code may, however, fit poorly with other institutions of 
member states, potentially causing large costs. Leaving codes to the states leads to 
competition across states, and may generate forces for change for the better. Competition also 
generates information about the effectiveness and costs of different commercial codes. 
Because any country’s initial code is likely to be sub-optimal, and is likely to become less 
optimal over time, information on how to improve codes is valuable. Likely it is easier to 
learn and adapt from member states than from other countries.  
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Creeping Federalization: Limits on Economic Harmonization in 
The United States and The European Union  
 
1. Introduction 
The extent of power accumulated at the federal level in the U.S. has risen 
substantially since the 1930s, and continues to rise. As for the European Union, “an ever 
closer union” is an explicit goal, and power has risen sharply at the Union level since the days 
of the European Coal and Steel Community. These trends towards federalizing power in the 
EU and the U.S. raise the questions of how much power, and which powers, are best allocated 
to the federal government, and which left with the member states. The U.S. Constitution 
contains specific, limited, enumerated powers allocated to the federal government, designed 
to limit federal accumulation of power. This paper reviews a number of episodes and trends in 
U.S. history to assess the costs and benefits of imposing such limits on EU institutions in a 
new EU constitution, especially in light of federal accumulation of power since the 1930s.  
Harmonization is a major concern in the EU. For example, there is considerable 
effort being made in the EU to increase harmonization of tax policies across member states, 
and to a lesser extent to impose harmonization of expenditures policies. Various aspects of 
EU member-states’ commercial codes have already been harmonized, and the desirability of 
substantially more harmonization is being raised in discussion. In imposing harmonization, 
the EU is not as clearly constrained by constitutional limits as the U.S. federal government.   
The EU is considering a constitution. A major issue is what limitations it might be 
prudent to put on the powers of the EU to compel these various types of harmonization across 
member states. This paper briefly examines the evolution of federalization in the U.S., and the 
pros and cons of U.S. harmonization in a number of cases. On the basis of this discussion, the 
paper raises doubts about the wisdom of harmonization across member states that is imposed 
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by the EU, and thus makes the case for constitutional restrictions on this type of creeping 
federalization. To be sure, in some of areas of harmonization, costs and benefits are relatively 
low, or at least the net costs are relatively low; thus, the decision on harmonization is not 
crucial to the economic health, let alone the survival of the EU as a whole. One example, 
perhaps, is harmonization of commercial codes. Other areas of harmonization, for example, 
tax codes and more particularly harmonization of tax rates across member states, may have 
substantial negative net economic effects. Over time, the negative effects from misguided 
harmonization may be severe enough cumulatively to lead to serious political strife that could 
threaten the EU. One way to analyze the break up of the U.S. in 1860-1861, and the following 
Civil War, is in terms of perceived threats from federal government power and member-state 
reactions to them. 
At various points, the paper compares harmonization in the EU with harmonization 
in the U.S. The federal nature of the U.S. system sees to it that there is often incomplete 
harmonization. This does not mean that the U.S. approach is correct. Rather, the U.S. provides 
a concrete base case for use in considering limitations that the EU may find it prudent to put 
limitations on its own powers to compel harmonization. Further, both the EU and the U.S. are 
federations, in the sense that some but not all sovereign power is at the federal level, and some 
sovereign power is at the level of member states. It is valuable to look at another major 
federation in considering a constitution for the EU. A substantial part of the U.S. history 
discussed in this paper is from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. On the one hand, this 
reduces the relevance to twenty-first century issues. On the other hand, during this period the 
U.S. was developing federal institutions just as the EU is now.   
2. Growth of Harmonization in the U.S. and the EU  
The U.S. Constitution limits the powers of the federal government, but as noted 
above these powers have nevertheless grown substantially since the 1930s. This growth arises 
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for four reasons. One method for creeping federalization is that the federal constitution trumps 
member-state laws, or is the supreme law.1 In areas where the U.S. Constitution gives the 
federal government the right to act, for example, regarding international commerce or 
bankruptcy, differences in state laws are pre-empted. As the federal government introduces 
more laws, regulations, etc., in its sphere of supremacy, it creates more homogeneity. EU 
treaties similarly trump member-state laws; through mechanisms similar to the U.S.’s, the 
sphere of EU standards expands over time.  
 A second mechanism is federal pressure for harmonization of economic laws, rules 
and regulations across member states. Harmonization is popular and many view it as a good 
thing in both the U.S. and the EU, though it appears more popular in the EU than the U.S.  
Harmonization is restrained in the U.S. by the requirement that the federal government has to 
show that its actions are constitutionally justified by its powers either under the Interstate 
Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause, or under its powers “to promote the 
general welfare.”2  For example, one of the main goals of the supporters of a new U.S. 
constitution in 1787 was to form a customs union. In their view, interstate trade policy had to 
be removed from the hands of the separate states and lodged with the federal government, and 
the federal government should adopt uniform trade policies for all states (Madison 1920, 
Bowen 1966, Miller 1992, Berkin 2002). From this viewpoint, the Interstate Commerce 
                                                             
1 Constitution of the United States: Article 6, Section 2: “This constitution, and the laws of the United States 
which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of 
the United States shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any 
thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.”  
2 Constitution of the United States: Article 1, Section 8: “The Congress shall have the power 1. To lay and 
collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general 
welfare of the United States…” 
     During the Civil War, the framers on the Confederate Constitution closely followed the U.S. Constitution, but 
altered it where it bore on Southern grievances against the federal government. To be sure, a major purpose of 
the Confederate constitution is to explicitly permit and defend slavery. Its writers, however, had additional 
ideological purposes. Because they thought the U.S. Constitution’s clause to “promote the general welfare” was 
so broad that the federal government had used it to abuse the states’ rights, they omitted this clause from their 
constitution. For similar reasons, they omitted the clause “to provide for the common defense.” 
 4
Clause3 is designed to prevent states from putting restrictions on interstate commerce. On the 
one hand, the clause gives powers to the federal government to regulate interstate commerce; 
on the other hand, the federal government is restricted to at least some extent.4 Restrictions on 
how far the federal government can go in imposing harmonization under the Interstate 
Commerce Clause have weakened greatly since the early 1900s, especially since the 1930s. 
From the point of view of the mid-1940s, Vreeland (1944) pp. 14-15) writes:  
 
[A]mong the powers expressly delegated to the United States was not police power. 
That is a technical phrase. It has nothing to do with brass button and a night stick. It 
is the power of a state to act in the interest of public health and morals and safety…. 
[T]he United States has built its police power as a “necessary and proper” power to 
make effective its powers, which were expressly granted. For many years the 
Supreme Court never admitted that it was constructing such a power but recently it 
has conceded with commendable frankness that it has done so. Almost all of this 
Federal police power in time of peace rests upon the expressly granted power to 
regulate interstate commerce. [Italics added.]  
 
The Necessary and Proper Clause5 is the device that expands the limited, 
enumerated powers that are all the constitution grants the federal government. Attempts to 
include in the Constitution or Bill of Rights the restriction that the federal government had 
only the explicit enumerated powers were beaten back (McDonald 2000, Miller 1992). 
Instead, the federal government had these enumerated powers, and any other powers that 
were necessary and proper to exercise the enumerated powers, provided only that these un-
enumerated powers are not explicitly denied to the federal government or reserved to the 
states or people.6 Based on the Interstate Commerce Clause, the federal government imposed 
federal minimum wage laws across the states, imposed federal food and drug regulations, and 
                                                             
3 Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Section 8. “The Congress shall have the Power … To regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” 
4Starting in the 1930s, a series of Supreme Court cases discuss direct effects on interstate trade, indirect effects, 
and whether the effects are substantial, with the federal government acquiring increasingly broad scope to 
regulate. For a skeptical discussion in the midst of this expansion, see Vreeland (1944). Beginning in the 1990s, 
the Supreme Court has fixed at least modest restrictions on federal power under the Interstate Commerce clause. 
5 Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Section 8. “The Congress shall have the Power … To make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other 
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof.” (italics added.) 
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regulated hours and working conditions in the states to a large extent, among other things; the 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of these laws as necessary and proper exercises of 
powers the Constitution grants the federal government.  
As noted above, “police powers” is a technical term that refers to the traditional 
Anglo-American legal and regulatory categories of property relations, family relations, 
education, religion, public health, public safety, public morals and crime. The EU has 
supreme power in some parts of the police powers in EU countries. All members of the EU 
have ratified the Maastricht Treaty, and have also adopted the European Charter of Human 
Rights as part of their constitutional law. The Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty, and the 
European Charter of Human Rights, allow for EU regulation of working hours and conditions, 
social policies regarding prostitution and homosexuality, etc. The European Commission does 
some of the regulation under police power, and the European Court of Justice has a major role 
in interpreting what the guaranteed rights mean in practice. Thus, both the EU and the U.S. 
federal government started out with very little police power, but both have accumulated large 
amounts over time, for example, over wages, working hours and working conditions. Both 
have some, though limited, power over education across member states. The EU probably has 
less power over crime and some aspects of public safety than does the federal government. In 
both the EU and the U.S., most police officers are under member-state control, though law 
enforcement is substantially more centralized in the average EU member state than in the 
average U.S. state.   
The EU also has supreme power in some areas because of single-market powers in 
the Maastricht treaty. The EU can impose some harmonization of manufacturing standards, 
and can regulate many arrangements for selling and buying, and impose many quality 
standards.    
                                                                                                                                                                                              
6 Some argue that the U.S. Constitution is designed in effect to foster capitalism. For the debate, see Goldwin 
and Schambra, eds. (1982). In particular, McDonald (1982) argues that the Constitution was far from designed to 
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 Police powers are inherently subject to expansion, allowing both widening and 
deepening of harmonization. U.S. attempts to place restraints on federal harmonization of 
police powers have been increasingly ineffective since the 1930s. EU attempts under the 
principle of “subsidiarity” have less constitutional standing and have been even less effective. 
In the absence of amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court has the only 
substantial, effective power to prevent harmonization across states that the executive or 
legislative branches desire. As seen above, he Supreme Court has been quite accommodating 
to expansion of federally imposed harmonization since the 1930s. In the 1990s, however, the 
Court has placed some restrictions on federal powers. It is not clear how extensively the Court 
might restrict federal power in the future; the Constitution’s explicit limitations on federal 
power, however, gives the Court substantial scope to act if it wants to. In the EU, it appears 
that there are relatively few constitutional statements that explicitly limit the scope of federal 
powers over harmonization. Thus, there is scope for imposing constitutional limits on the 
ability of EU institutions to impose harmonization. U.S. history suggests that later judicial 
interpretation in the EU may be able to get around constitutional restrictions, even carefully 
drawn restrictions, but these appear to be the only barrier. European Court of Justice decisions 
have often taken an expansive view of EU powers to impose harmonization.  
A third, related mechanism is that the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment grants 
citizens the same rights and protections against state government as the Constitution grants 
against the federal government, or rather this is the Supreme Court’s firm view since the 
1950s, after previously holding the opposite. For example, the federal government sets the 
limits on religious expression in public schools that states may permit, under the power of 
enforcing the First Amendment guarantees regarding freedom of religion7. Federal law has 
thus become supreme over state law in the wide range of areas covered by the federal Bill of 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
foster capitalism.  
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Rights. Further, under the Fourteenth Amendment’s “due process” and “equal protection“ 
clauses, the Supreme Court has final say on whether a state’s law treats its citizens in a 
constitutional way8, and thus has great influence on state laws and practices.9  The European 
Court of Justice similarly has final say on a range of issues covered by EU treaties, including 
the social chapter in the Maastricht Treaty and the European Convention on Human Rights; 
this is analogous to the federal government to decide what member states must do to be 
consistent with U.S. Bill of Rights.   
Fourth, a major increase in the federal government’s power to impose harmonization 
across the states came from the Sixteenth Amendment (ratified February 3, 1913), which 
allows Congress to impose income taxes. Before, the federal government was severely limited 
in the amount of revenue it could raise—tariffs were a major source of revenues. In the period 
after the Second World War, the federal government introduced many programs that offered 
the states federal funds, but only on condition that the states adopt federal standards in areas 
related to the programs (and sometimes only distantly related to the programs, some argue). 
For example, for some years, the federal government threatened to withhold highway funds 
from states that did not impose a maximum speed limit of 55 miles per hour. In addition, the 
federal income tax code contains a wide variety of incentives and disincentives designed to 
affect individuals’ behavior. Of course, the federal government would not have the revenues 
to exercise this great amount of leverage in the absence of the power to impose income taxes.  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
7 Constitution of the United States: First Amendment, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; …”    
8 Constitution of the United States: Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, “…. No State shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws….’ (italics added.) 
9 From the point of view of the mid-1940s, Vreeland (1944, p. 15): 
[L]imiting governmental powers in favor of persons are two general and non-particularized 
constitutional provisions known as the “due process” and “equal protection” clauses…. The due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment limits Federal action…. In the Fourteenth Amendment there 
are both due process and equal protection clauses, each limiting State power in favor of persons. 
Since then, the Fourteenth Amendment has been used to substitute federal for state control over the “police 
power.” See above.   
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One measure of federal influence on the U.S. is the number of federal government 
employees and their distribution across jobs and geographically. In the early days of the U.S., 
the federal government was quite small, and many people had little contact with federal 
employees, beyond postal employees. Fleming (1999, p. 103) writes:10  
The federal government was a puny affair in 1804. Excluding 6,479 sailors, soldiers, 
and marines, it numbered only 2,267 employees. Most of these worked as postmasters 
and collectors of customs in distant cities and towns. Congress, the Supreme Court, 
the president and his cabinet, and their employees numbered only 293 people. When 
this tiny band migrated to the Federal District in 1800, they virtually vanished from 
the national consciousness.  
 
Note that the U.S. population in 1790 census was approximately 4 million. Over time, federal 
employment has grown strikingly. For comparison, consider Table 1, which incorporates the 
numbers from Fleming (1999). U.S. government civilian employment trended modestly 
upward during the nineteenth century, but the comparison with 1970 is startling. Of course, 
the expansion in federal revenues after the income tax was instituted financed much of the 
growth in federal employment after the Second World War. At the start of the Civil War in 
1861, for example, Table 1 implies that out of every 100,000 Americans a person might meet 
outside of Washington, DC, only 11 on average would be federal employees, and of these 
88% would be postal employees. By 1970, out of every 100,000 Americans a person might 
meet outside of Washington, DC, 130 on average would be federal employees, and of these 
only 28% would be postal employees. The average American deals a great more with the 
federal government than in the nineteenth century. To the extent dealing with federal 
employees reduces the average citizen’s regard for the federal government, the trends in 
employment put strains on the federal system. If the EU’s revenues are expanded by the 
ability to levy taxes, surely some will go to increase the number of EU employees, and thus 
the contact of the average EU citizens with EU employees.      
                                                             
10 Fleming’s notes refer to Friedenberg, Daniel M., Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Land. Buffalo, NY, 1992, p. 
345.  
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Aside from the EU’s lack of authority to impose income taxes, federalization in the 
EU has been subject to many fewer constitutional limitations than in the U.S. The ambience 
of federalization in the EU is captured, perhaps, by some quotes.  
A senior German diplomat [argues] that the big decisions in the European Union have 
always been made by elites, and have then gained popular acceptance later. “If we had 
had a referendum on the treaty of Rome, people might have rejected it on the grounds 
that it raised the price of bananas.” (Economist, Oct. 5, 2002, p. 36.)  
 
Jean-Claude Juncker, Luxembourg’s prime minister, once described the E.U.’s 
‘system.’ “We decide on something, leave it lying around and wait and see what 
happens,” he explained. “If no one kicks up a fuss, because most people don’t 
understand what has been decided, we continue step by step until there is no turning 
back.” (Economist, Sept. 14, 2002, p. 33.) 
   
Many Europeans are sceptical of this approach, and would like to have EU powers more 
clearly defined and limited. An example, perhaps, is    
The [EU] constitution should start with just a few lines, setting out what the EU is—a 
union of sovereign states who have decided to pool some of that sovereignty, better to 
secure peace and prosperity in Europe and the wider world. It should confirm that the 
Union exercises only those powers that are explicitly and freely conferred on it by the 
member states, which remain the EU’s primary source of democratic legitimacy. (Jack 
Straw, “A constitution for Europe,” Economist, Oct. 12, 2002, pp. 41- 42.)  
 
3. Costs and Benefits from Federal Harmonization   
In a federal system, many federal decisions—executive orders, legislation, court 
decisions, etc.—fundamentally involve harmonization of laws across member states. The 
federal government may make new law that applies to all member states, with the new law 
ipso facto harmonized across states. Or the federal government may address issues already 
subject to member-state laws, and in doing so force partial or complete harmonization of laws 
across member states—provided federal constitution and laws etc., are supreme over the 
states in the particular area, or the federal government can use fiscal incentives, etc.  
In both the U.S. and the EU, member states often oppose a given instance of economic 
harmonization. For example, opposition is likely to occur if harmonization removes a 
competitive advantage or creates a competitive disadvantage for a subset of member states. A 
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well-known example for the EU is harmonization of bank secrecy laws. Another example is 
the struggle in the EU over harmonization of tax policies. To the extent that the results of a 
particular harmonization are a zero-sum game across EU member states, the average state can 
hope to break even on progressive harmonization—but at the risk of suffering on net, either 
through chance or because of the lack of political power to block harmonization that severely 
harms the member state.11 In such cases, the risk of loss dominates the zero expected gain, 
because of risk aversion. As for the EU compared to the rest of the world, harmonization may 
work to remove a competitive advantage or to create a competitive disadvantage for the 
average member state and the EU as a whole—in such a case, the average member state loses, 
as does the EU as a whole. An example is tax harmonization if it is at such high rates that the 
EU is at an increased disadvantage relative to the U.S., Japan or the rest of the world.    
The Race to the Bottom. In discussions in the EU, as in the U.S., economic 
harmonization across member states is frequently contrasted with a “race to the bottom,” in 
which some states gain an advantage over other member states by adopting economic laws or 
regulations that are less stringent than the average across the federation. It is sometimes 
argued that in the limit, the race to bottom can lead all member states to adopt the laws and 
regulations of the least stringent member state, or that many businesses will arrange matters 
so that, wherever they operate, the least stringent code applies. An example sometimes 
offered is the fact that a large percentage of major American firms are incorporated in 
Delaware, where laws are seen as more favorable to corporations than in other states; other 
states need not adopt a code as relaxed as Delaware’s, but few corporations will be 
headquartered in them. To the extent this happens, “the race to the bottom” can be viewed as a 
                                                             
11 To be sure, federal harmonization is likely to have differential effects on the citizens within a given member 
state, some losing, some gaining. If the gainers have sufficient power, the member state may support the 
harmonization, though the population as a whole loses. Taking account of such complications does not change 
the major points in this paper, and hence such complications are not explicitly discussed below. 
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mechanism towards harmonization of standards, but at less stringent levels than those 
supported by advocates of imposing federal harmonization.  
In principle, harmonization might be aimed at adopting federal standards that are less, 
rather than more, stringent than most member states have. In practice, harmonization is most 
often proposed at levels that compel some member states to adopt harsher laws; indeed, that 
often seems the purpose of harmonization. The regular contrast between harmonization and 
“the race to the bottom” reveals how efforts at harmonization are frequently aimed at 
imposing more stringent federal standards than some member states currently use. 
Harmonization of tax rates at a high level in the EU, for example, may benefit those member 
states with high tax rates, to the disadvantage of those with low taxes, in inter-EU 
competition. Harmonization also has effects on the EU vis-à-vis other countries or the rest of 
the world. If EU taxes are harmonized at a level that is notably severe relative to the U.S., 
Japan and other international competitors, the EU as a whole may be harmed, even if some 
high-tax EU states gain on net from facing less competition from other EU states that would 
otherwise have lower tax rates.  
Efficiency, Redistribution and Side Effects. Any particular instance of harmonization 
is generally supported by the argument that it will lead to greater efficiency, and make the 
federation as whole better off. In the cases discussed above, however, a major effect of 
harmonization is redistribution among member states. This suggests a skeptical attitude 
towards claims of increased efficiency from harmonization. In particular, if a given instance 
of harmonization is supported as the alternative to a “race to the bottom,” perhaps the 
presumption ought to be that the major effects are on distribution, not efficiency, and that 
claims of enhanced efficiency should be documented with substantial evidence before being 
accepted.     
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Sometimes harmonization involves only one part of an interrelated set of issues. In 
such a case, harmonization implicitly requires many other adjustments in a given country’s 
laws if harmonization is to work well; if the other, interrelated laws are not adjusted, or are 
adjusted poorly, harmonization may injure the member state. An example discussed below is 
harmonization of commercial codes across member states in a federation. In the U.S., there is 
only partial harmonization of commercial codes across the states (similarly, there is only 
partial harmonization of other types of regulations on economic activity). In harmonizing over 
only one set of issues, the danger is that the overall web of regulations and institutions for a 
given member state is moved farther from rather than closer to optimality. As seen below, 
given the costs of adjusting other laws and institutions, and the lags in doing so, commercial 
code harmonization with positive gross benefits may impose such substantial costs that the 
result is negative net benefits.  
Harmful Effects of Harmonization, and The Reservoir of Goodwill. Thus far, two 
types of harmonization may harm the average member state: (a) harmonization aimed at 
redistribution that does not help or actually harms the average member state, and (b) 
harmonization with positive gross benefits but negative net benefits. Repeated experience of 
these two types of costly harmonization can easily the drain the reservoir of goodwill of the 
member states towards the federal government. Member states are not stupid, they often resist 
harmonization that hurts them for others’ gains, and are embittered when they lose these 
struggles. Goodwill is a vital ingredient in making any federal system work well. To be 
concrete, think of goodwill as the pre-disposition of member states to believe that federal 
decisions in general work to help the average member state, and that over time and over many 
decisions, harmonization is likely to make each member state better off. In every instance of 
proposed harmonization, there are always pros and cons, the balance between the pros and 
cons is often unclear, and often there are some member states that lose while others gain. In 
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the absence of goodwill—a presumption in favor of federal harmonization when it is 
proposed—harmonization ma y face great difficulty in gaining the assent of the member states. 
If the federal government spends its store of goodwill on dubious measures of harmonization, 
member states may later refuse to accept particular measures that are in fact beneficial. Or, if 
the member states cannot resist federal measures for harmonization, hostility towards the 
federal government is likely to grow. The more member states believe “the system works,” 
the more likely they are to let the federal system work. And the more member states believe 
“the system does not work,” the harder is it for the federal system to work.  
Examples from U.S. History: Loss of Goodwill Towards Federal Government. U.S. 
history provides a number of important examples about how the loss of goodwill in a federal 
system can harm the system and even put it in danger of falling apart. In the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, one region in the U.S. and then another came to feel that it was 
systematically treated badly by the federal government, and that the region could do little 
politically to protect itself from the federal government. One case was New England from say 
1803 to the 1820s. During this period, the Democratic Republican party, initially organized by 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, dominated the federal government and many states, 
and it appeared that the opposition Federalists, centered in New England, were permanently 
cut off from power. New England Federalists were hostile to President Thomas Jefferson’s 
Louisiana Purchase of 1803, because they thought the huge territory would eventually be split 
into states that would be aligned against New England’s interests, putting New England in a 
permanent minority. In 1807-1809, at the height of the Napoleonic wars, President Jefferson 
imposed an embargo on all trade, and progressively tightened the embargo and the penalties 
for violating it. The purpose of the embargo was to avoid becoming entangled in the wars 
between Britain and her allies on one side against France on the other side. The result was 
gravely to harm shipping and trade, on which New England depended extensively. In 1812, at 
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the request of President James Madison, Congress declared war on Britain, but virtually no 
member of Congress from north of Pennsylvania voted for the war, which lasted until 1815. 
The war severely harmed New England commercial interests. Many New England Federalists 
reacted by talking of interposition, nullification and even secession (Adams 1905, Banner 
1970).   
By 1820, conflicts over slavery and other issues convinced many in the South that they 
were being treated badly by the Union. In the South, opinions on slavery changed from 
viewing it as a necessary evil, when the Constitution was ratified in 1787-1990, to considering 
it as a positive benefit to the slave and master (McPherson 1988). Further, Southern opinion 
evolved from favoring or acquiescing in restricting slavery to where it existed, to demanding 
that slavery’s expansion in the territories be allowed and even assisted by the federal 
government. At the same time, opposition to the expansion of slavery on moral grounds grew 
in the North and Mid-West. Further, from very low levels in 1820, sentiment for complete 
abolition of slavery grew in the North.   
The South had other complaints about treatment by the federal government. A key 
complaint was the adoption of protective tariffs that favored Northern manufacturers at the 
expense of Southern agricultural producers. In response, the South developed the doctrine of 
Nullification. Some in the South complained that federal revenues were not fairly allocated to 
public works in their area (the fights over “internal improvements”).12 In the 1840s, conflicts 
over tariffs were settled by agreement on a lower tariff that was not heavily geared toward 
                                                             
12 The Constitution permits the federal government to impose and collect taxes only “to pay the Debts and 
provide for the common Defense and general welfare of the United States.” McDonald (1985, pp. 264-265) 
writes: 
The phraseology was derived from the language of the Articles of Confederation and was understood 
as prohibiting the expenditure of money for such “internal improvements” as roads and canals, since 
those must of necessity, promote the particular welfare of specific states rather than the “general” 
welfare…. Hamilton, an advocate of “loose construction” though he was, thought that Congress could 
not authorize the building of such internal improvements as canals, and he proposed a constitutional 
amendment granting such power.  
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protection, and by the early 1850s, the federal government was providing large subsidies, 
through land grants, for railroads, the major internal improvement then being discussed.  
By the 1850s, though the problems of the tariff and internal improvements were 
basically solved, many in the South had hostile feelings towards the North, as did many in the 
North towards the South. On the one hand, many in the South felt that the other regions were 
out to establish permanent dominance over the South, with the goal of eventually destroying 
slavery and Southern society. On the other hand, many in the North felt there existed a “slave 
power” that dominated the federal government, that the “slaveocracy” dominated the country. 
Representatives and senators across the regions found it increasingly difficult to co-operate or 
trust each other; shouts, threats and fistfights sometimes occurred, and some members began 
to carry weapons on the floors of Congress. There seemed little goodwill left for finding a 
solution. Eventually, these tensions resulted in Southern-state secession and the Civil War; 
over 600,000 men lost their lives in the war.    
When Federal Harmonization Helps. To be sure, in some cases, harmonization can in 
principle benefit the average member state. First, the member states may be in a type of 
prisoners’ dilemma. Each state knows that if all shift to say a new, harmonized commercial 
code, all will be better off. But if one state shifts and the others do not, that state loses and the 
others gain. Federal decision makers ma y then impose harmonization that all agree is 
beneficial but would be otherwise hard to achieve. 
An example from U.S. history is the harmonization across states of internal tariffs at 
zero. Economic theory suggests that the states were better off on average from this 
harmonization, but history suggests that it was very difficult for any one state to adopt a 
permanent zero-tariff strategy against other states that pursued active protectionist policies.   
Second, a member state may have a dysfunctional government that finds it difficult to 
adopt policies that are favored by and beneficial to a substantial majority of the state’s 
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citizens. An example is systemic corruption with which the state has been unable to deal. 
Harmonization may aid the state in fighting corruption by imposing federal standards that the 
state would be unable to pass or to police for itself. If the harmonization helps the 
dysfunctional state and harms none of the others, all is well. But the types of laws that help a 
dysfunctional state ma y by sub-optimal for better-run states, and these better-run states may 
feel badly used. On the one hand, some EU member states—some observers suggest, for 
example, Italy or some of the central European candidate states—may expect federal 
decisions to be less corrupt than those taken at the national level. On the other hand, EU 
member states such as the Nordic countries may have more faith in the probity of their 
national governments rather than in the probity of EU decision makers. Raising decisions to 
the federal level may result in less corruption on average for member states, but in more 
corruption for those states that have low corruption to start with. These less corrupt states may 
then view the EU as having a bias towards federal decisions that harm them.  
Delegates to the U.S. Constitutional Convention in 1787 were well aware of the poor 
quality of government that existed in some of the thirteen states. Rhode Island, often referred 
to as Rogues’ Island, was notorious and was not interested in reform—it refused to send 
delegates to the Convention (Bowen 1966, McDonald 1985, Miller 1992, Berkin 2002). 
Observers charged that its legislature was corrupt, that it ran inflationary monetary policies, 
that it abused its legal-tender power, and that it discriminated against creditors from other 
states. Some feared that poorly run states would degenerate into some non-republican form of 
government. A number of proposals at the Convention were designed to deal with problems 
of unsatisfactory state governance. Perhaps the principle proposal, which James Madison 
strongly pushed, was to give the Federal legislature a veto (or a “negative” as they called it) 
over any state law (Madison 1920, Bowen 1966, Miller 1992, Berkin 2002). Madison pushed 
for such a negative on many occasions, but never got majority support. In a sense, under 
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current Supreme Court interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 
the federal judiciary has acquired a veto over state laws that are judged inconsistent with the 
rights guaranteed by the U.S. constitution.13 Before the Fourteenth Amendment, the individual 
states could make some laws that it would be unconstitutional for the U.S. Congress to make. 
An example is an established church. The First Amendment forbids the Federal government 
to establish any religion; individual states, however, could and did have established churches. 
In 1833, the Supreme Court ruled that the Bill of Rights “applied only to the national federal 
government, not to the states.” Smith (1996, p. 520.) By the mid-twentieth century, however, 
the U.S. Supreme Court had adopted the view that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
states must respect the rights that were guaranteed by the Constitution at the federal level; if 
Congress could not violate a particular right, neither could state legislatures.    
Other restraints on unsatisfactory state governance were adopted, primarily by moving 
specified powers from the state to the federal level.14 The Constitution does not allow states to 
issue their own money15, and or to decide on legal tender16. The Constitution gives Congress 
the right to draw up a national bankruptcy code17. The Constitution guarantees that each state 
will have a republican form of government.18 The Federal government may also use force to 
suppress rebellions within a state.19          
                                                             
13 See a footnote above for Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
14 Farrand (1937, Vols. 1 - 4) offers a compilation of records of the convention, and some later documents that 
bear on Convention issues. For notes by members of the Convention, see Hamilton (VA), Madison (VA), King 
(MA), McHenry (MD), Lansing (NY), Paterson (NJ), Pierce (GA) and Yates (NY). Bowen (1966) provides a 
narrative of the Convention, and Berkin (2002) provides a more abbreviated narrative. Berkin provides brief 
biographies of the framers, and NARA (National Archives and Records Administration), Constitution web page, 
provides longer biographies of the fifty-five Framers. See also Miller (1992) and McDonald (1979, 1985).  
15 Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Section 9: “No State shall … coin money …”  
16 Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Section 9: “No State shall … make any Thing but gold and silver 
Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts …” 
17 Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Section 8: “The Congress shall have Power … To establish … 
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcy throughout the United States …”  
18 Constitution of the United States, Article 4, Section 4: “The United States shall guarantee to every state in this 
Union a Republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion, and on Application of 
the Legislature …. against domestic Violence.” 
19 Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Section 8: “The Congress shall have Power … To provide for 
calling forth the Militia to … suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.” See also a footnote above on Article 4, 
Section 4.    
 18
If federal decision makers aim at harmonization that solves prisoners’ dilemma 
situations, then federal harmonization is likely to increase goodwill towards the federal 
government. If federal decision makers aim at harmonization that helps dysfunctional states, 
but is carefully designed to leave unharmed well-functioning states, again federal activity is 
likely to increase goodwill towards the federal government. To the extent that the federal 
government is chary about forcing harmonization that would not help the average state, or 
would actually harm the average state, and is seen to be chary about this, in the aggregate 
federal harmonization raises the reservoir of goodwill. As discussed in the next section, 
decision makers are apt to ignore the overall health of the system and thus to push for 
harmonization that harms the system as a whole.  
Until the 1950s, the Supreme Court dealt with cases involving the states primarily 
under three heads. One was conflicts involving interstate trade. Another was suits by one state 
against other states. A third was suits by citizens against states. These heads led to a number 
of important Supreme Court decisions that gave important structure to economic laws and 
regulations. In particular, as seen above, the Supreme Court started in the 1930s to interpret 
the Interstate Commerce clause in such an expansive manner that the federal government 
accumulated substantial police powers. This empowered the federal government to impose 
over time a good deal of harmonization in a wide variety of areas, through laws passed by 
Congress, through regulations imposed by the executive branch, and through lower court 
decisions that followed the law as interpreted by the Supreme Court. These efforts at 
harmonization were not systematic, but were mainly small steps that added up. In addition, 
starting in the 1950s, the Supreme Court has intervened extensively under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and under the right to privacy that the Supreme Court finds is implied by 
“penumbras” formed by “emanations” from the First, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendment to 
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the Constitution.20,  21 These decisions have moved even more police powers to the federal 
level and out of the hands of the states. Thus, piecemeal over the past seventy years, federal 
laws, executive orders and court decisions have imposed a great deal of harmonization across 
the states. In each instance of harmonization, however, the federal decision makers involved 
seldom had any incentive to consider the cumulative effects of harmonization on goodwill 
towards the federal government. As discussed below, because federal bureaucrats do not 
consider the effects of their decisions on goodwill in exercising police powers, their decisions 
create externalities.     
4. Damage from Federal Tax Harmonization 
 One of the major purposes of replacing the Articles of Confederation with the U.S. 
Constitution was to solve the problem of the individual states running their own trade policies, 
including protectionism aimed at the other states and retaliation for such protection. The 
Constitution in effect made the thirteen members states a customs union, with internal tariffs 
set at zero and a common external tariff. In forming a customs union, likely the only realistic 
candidates for membership were some subset of the 13 states. Given that the states were to 
adopt a common external tariff, economic conventional wisdom is that internal tariffs should 
be set at zero. Thus, federal harmonization of tariffs, with external tariffs at a common level 
and with internal tariffs at a level of zero, was good economic sense.   
                                                             
20 The Court has used this right of privacy to strike down restrictions on birth control, on abortion and on 
sodomy. Constitution of the United States, First Amendment:  “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”  
     Fourth Amendment: “The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated …”  
     Fifth Amendment: “No person … shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall any private property be taken for 
public use without just compensation.”  
     Ninth Amendment: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people.”  
21 Choplecki (1992) agues that at least until the 1890s, “[T]he right to privacy was developing … as an 
outgrowth of property rights. The Third, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments … all protected people and 
their property against government intrusions." The Third Amendment essentially gives the federal judiciary 
power over a wide variety of cases. See footnotes above for the Fourth. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.   
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 On theoretical grounds, tax harmonization in the EU is likely to be at rates that are 
higher than optimal for the interests of the EU. Tax harmonization is thus likely to harm the 
average EU member state and its citizens, and to deplete member-state goodwill towards the 
EU.  
Incentives in Federal Harmonization. There is little reason to think that any federal 
government makes harmonization decisions in general with an eye towards maintaining or 
increasing the reservoir of goodwill. Instead, it appears that effects on goodwill are mostly 
ignored in making individual federal decisions, and these decisions thus have external effects 
on goodwill towards the federal government. Further, a series of decisions with negative 
externalities are likely to have cumulative effects on good will (as would a series of positive 
effects). As seen below, it is quite easy for federal harmonization to be of the type that drains 
goodwill; thus, it is likely that on balance the external effects on goodwill are negative.  
At the federal level, member states tend to push for what they view as their self-
interest, often with little concern for the damage a given decision does to the health of the 
federal system—a negative external effect. Powerful senators from Mississippi have used 
federal regulations and subsidies to maintain a large but inefficient shipbuilding industry in 
their state over the decades since the second world war, and these senators have shown little 
concern for the costs imposed on the rest of the states. Federal bureaus tend to develop their 
own self-interests and clienteles, and to focus on these rather than the overall health of the 
federal system—again, a negative externality. Agencies such as the Agriculture Department 
strongly tend to represent the interests of various farm groups rather than the interests of the 
U.S. as a whole. To be sure, representatives from member states as well as federal bureaucrats 
may sincerely wish the federal system as a whole to prosper. The essence of externalities is 
that these decision makers do not take full account of the externality on goodwill in their cost-
benefit calculus.  
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In the U.S., the federal government sets minimum wage levels that apply everywhere 
in the country. Many states also have minimum wage laws, though they must be at least as 
stringent as federal standards. States with more generous minimums sometimes push to have 
federal standards raised. Similarly, on a variety of issues, unions have succeeded in having 
national labor standards imposed by Congress or by executive orders that supersede less 
generous state standards.   
Incentives to Harmonize at Too Stringent Levels A federal system contains strong 
incentives to push for harmonization of standards at too stringent levels. Take an example. 
Suppose French tax rates are higher than optimal, and that the lower British tax rates are at the 
optimal level for the EU. If France is unwilling to cut its rates, it may push for harmonization 
at high rates, to remove its competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis lower-tax EU countries such as 
Britain. Britain of course has an incentive to keep things as they are rather than to harmonize 
at high rates.  
Britain likely does not have an incentive to push for harmonization at its low tax rates, 
however—this would destroy some of its competitive advantage vis-à-vis high-tax EU 
countries. To be sure, harmonization at the low end of the range of EU rates would benefit the 
EU as a whole, but the net effects on Britain would be less beneficial than for other EU 
countries, and might be negative. Further, Britain would have to expend political capital to 
produce gains that accrue mostly to others—and the others may not be at all grateful. A 
country is loath to spend political capital on projects that largely benefit others. 
Harmonization is thus more likely to be pushed for by countries that have tax rates or 
regulations more stringent than optimal.  
Further, countries are more likely to favor harmonization in general if they are 
powerful at the level of federal decision-making. With such power, they have a chance to get 
harmonization they like and to kill harmonization they do not.  
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Thus, countries have an incentive to sort themselves based on (a) the stringency of 
their regulations relative to most EU countries, and (b) their political power at the federal 
level. If a country is large, and thus likely has more power at the federal level, ceteris paribus, 
and if it has relatively stringent regulations, then that country has an incentive to favor a 
federal system where harmonization is easy to achieve and where there are relatively loose 
constitutional limits on the scope and depth of possible harmonization. A small country with 
relatively mild regulations has an incentive to adopt a general “states rights” position, where 
harmonization is difficult to impose and there are strong constitutional limits on the scope and 
depth of possible harmonization. Such a country might favor requiring super majorities to 
impose most types of harmonization, and, more strongly, might favor including in the 
constitution only a narrow list of areas that are subject to harmonization.  
 Nordic countries may be torn. They have stringent environmental regulations, high 
taxes, elaborate welfare systems and highly regulated labor markets. In intra-EU competition, 
they are likely to benefit from federal harmonization at the stringent end of the spectrum. 
Because they are small, however, under many systems of weighted voting they have little 
power individually at the federal level, and may be unable to block particular instances of 
harmonization that they strongly oppose. Ceteris paribus, countries with little power at the 
federal level have an incentive to favor strong restrictions on the federal government’s powers 
to impose harmonization, including tax harmonization.  
Heterogeneous Tax Rates in the U.S. Firms and households in the U.S. are subject to 
federal, state, local and special-district taxes. Federal taxes are homogeneous across the states; 
in general, federal tax laws cannot discriminate across states.22 State sales taxes, income taxes 
and property taxes show great heterogeneity. Some states have no sales tax and some have no 
income tax. Maximum sales taxes are close to 10 percent in some states, and some states have 
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maximum income tax rates well in excess of 10 percent (with the tax schedule steeply 
progressive). Some states tax all sales, and other states have lower or zero tax rates on some 
goods (for example, food or some baby-care products). Local taxes, by cities or counties, etc., 
include property taxes in particular, but also sales and income taxes, and these vary widely 
across jurisdictions. The effective tax rate on the market value of a house can very by a factor 
of five across states; many cities have no income taxes, and impose low or no sales taxes in 
addition to state sales taxes. Special districts are sometimes set up to deal with water, sewage, 
roads, etc., and the nature of these districts and their charges vary widely. Thus, there is an 
extraordinary range of marginal income, sales and property tax rates that firms and 
households face across locations. There is much anecdotal evidence that some firms and 
households pay serious attention to differential tax rates in making decisions on location. 
There is similar anecdotal evidence that, when setting their tax rates, governments sometimes 
feel forced to consider the competitive effects their taxing has on attracting firms and 
households.  
Restrictions in the U.S. Constitution see to it that in practice the federal government 
cannot impose harmonization of state, local and special-district tax rates across the U.S. This 
example does not mean that the EU should adopt similar or indeed any constitutional 
limitations on the ability of federal institutions to force tax harmonization. Rather, the U.S. is 
an example of a federation where substantial heterogeneity in tax rates has not prevented 
economic success. To be sure, heterogeneous tax rates under federalism are likely to be 
associated with economic inequality (Wildavsky 1998b), though perhaps at a high average 
level of income as in the U.S. As was argued above, incentives in harmonizing tax rates 
across member states are likely to lead to higher than optimal tax rates.     
                                                                                                                                                                                              
22 At least explicitly. The federal tax code is complicated, and some parts affect only a relatively few people or 
corporations, and those affected are sometimes concentrated in one or a few states. A powerful senator or 
representative may be able to secure a disproportionate number of breaks for home-state residents. 
 24
Contrast with Harmonization of Defense and Foreign Policies. On many economic 
issues, France has stringent economic standards and thus has an incentive to push for 
harmonization at stringent EU standards. Further, France is large and has substantial political 
power at the federal level to block harmonization it strongly opposes. Nevertheless, many 
French policy makers are skeptical of harmonization of EU foreign and defense policies in a 
unitary system that some observers envisage, rather than a system in which individual nation 
states continue to play strong defense and foreign policy roles, at time independent roles. The 
incentives to push for economic harmonization are different from those for harmonization of 
defense and foreign policies. These considerations suggest that some EU countries might see 
advantages to pushing for substantial harmonization in some areas, for example, social and 
economic policy, but for only loose harmonization in other areas, for example, defense and 
foreign policy.  
Harmonization at the United Nations Level. One strategy for such countries is to be 
in favor of harmonization in general, but to push for only some types of harmonization at the 
EU level, for example, economic and social policies. These countries might advocate 
harmonization of defense and foreign policies, but push for harmonization through 
negotiations and treaties at the level of the United Nations. In particular, the EU might devote 
its defense and foreign policy harmonization to such efforts as treaties on the International 
Criminal Court and global warming, but not to creating integrated, centralized EU military 
forces that are substantially independent of NATO and are subject to qualified majority EU 
voting.  
Another possibility is for the EU to use “variable geometry” or “variable speeds” in 
harmonizing foreign and defense policies. Arrangements might be made for traditional 
neutrals (Sweden, Ireland, Finland) to go their own way. For another subset of countries, 
some arrangements may allow for action by qualified majority voting but also allow for opt-
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outs for members of this sub-set that disagree. For example, for a subset of countries, 
qualified majority voting may decide official EU policy on use of military force, but the 
contribution by each member state may be largely voluntary and decided on a case-by-case 
basis.23    
Harmonization of Defense and Foreign Policies in The U.S. One of the main 
purposes of writing the U.S. Constitution in 1787 and adopting it in 1787-1790 was to ensure 
that defense and foreign policies were wholly centralized at the federal level. The thirteen 
states, organized then under The Articles of Confederation, faced very different circumstances 
from EU members. The states were surrounded by hostile powers: The British in Canada, the 
Spanish in the Floridas, as well as the Spanish in New Orleans, with the French still interested 
in reacquiring their former North America possessions of Canada an Louisiana, and all three 
countries in the Caribbean. The eighteenth century saw a great deal of war; periods of peace 
were more like breathers between wars than peace. It was difficult for small states to avoid 
choosing sides in these great-power wars. In particular, New England engaged in a good deal 
of shipping, and the Southern states were heavy agricultural exporters; they had to have some 
way of dealing with Britain, the dominant sea power of the age. Either the American states 
could centralize defense and foreign policy, of each state would be under tremendous pressure 
to accept junior partner status in alliance with one of the great powers: Britain, France, Spain, 
Russia, Austria-Hungary and other more minor powers such as The Netherlands, Prussia, 
Portugal, Sweden, etc. Rather than risk becoming entangled in the shifting pattern of 
European alliances, the states adopted the Constitution, which reserved all defense and 
foreign policy matters for the federal government.24  
                                                             
23 NATO’s Article 5 provides for common defense when a member state suffers external attack. The 
contributions of each country are not specified, however, and the discussions after September 11, 2001, hi-
jacking attacks made clear that Article 5 may in practice require only very modest contributions, for example, 
over-flight rights or rights to use airbases for some but not all purposes. 
24 Constitution of the United States, Section 1, Section 8: “The Congress shall have power To lay and collect 
Taxes, to pay the Debts and to provide for the Common Defense and general Welfare of the United States … To 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, … To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high 
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The member states of the EU are in very different circumstances as regards 
centralizing defense and foreign policies. Many are already members of military alliances 
with non-member states (e.g., Nato). A number have a more-or-less long tradition of 
neutrality (Sweden, Ireland, Finland, Austria). The pressures for joining any alliance are much 
less strong than in the late eighteenth century. The history of the U.S. shows that the possible 
costs of centralizing defense and foreign policies can be great. Centrifugal forces on the 
Union were substantial during the undeclared war with France in the late 1790s, the War of 
1812 against Britain (1812-1815), and the Mexican War (1846-1848). Similar pressures arose 
because of the Embargo on trade (1807-1809) imposed in an effort to prevent being dragged 
into the Napoleonic wars. New England threatened to secede in all these cases, and the 
pressures towards secession during the War of 1812 were strong (Banner 1970).     
5. Harmonization of Commercial Codes   
Harmonization of commercial codes is usefully viewed from a constitutional 
perspective. Should commercial codes be wholly federal, or important parts left to member 
states? On the one hand, a federal commercial code is uniform across member states and thus 
reduces transaction and information costs, compared to leaving important code issues to 
member states. Further, many states may retain codes for long periods that are sub-optimal 
compared to a given federal code. On the other hand, if member states are notably 
heterogeneous, a federal code may fit poorly with other institutions of member states, causing 
potentially large costs. Further, leaving codes to the states leads to competition across states, 
and this competition may generate forces for change for the better. Competition also generates 
information about the effectiveness and costs of different commercial codes. Because any 
initial code of a member country is likely to be sub-optimal, and is likely to become less 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations… To declare War … To raise and support Armies … To provide 
and maintain a Navy … To provide for calling forth the militia … To provide for organizing, arming, and 
disciplining the Militia …”  Section 10: “No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation …” 
 27
optimal over time, information on how to improve codes is valuable. In many cases, it may be 
easier to learn and adapt from member states than from other countries.  
Sometimes harmonization involves only one part of an interrelated set of issues. In 
such a case, harmonization implicitly requires many other adjustments in a given country’s 
laws if harmonization is to work well. Conversely, if the other, interrelated laws are not 
adjusted, or are adjusted poorly, harmonization may injure the member state. These general 
points apply to harmonization of commercial codes. To the extent that business practices 
differ sharply across EU member states, a harmonized commercial code that fits well with 
some states’ business practices may fit poorly with other states’ practices. For example, 
accounting standards and practices differ substantially across the EU countries. Countries that 
are damaged by harmonization must then limp along under a federal commercial code that is 
sub-optimal for them, or must change other, substantial parts of their business practices. Even 
if the harmonized commercial code and the new business practices associated with it are 
better on balance in the long run than the country’s previous system, the costs of changing the 
system may be large enough in present value terms that the country suffers from the 
harmonization. It is quite possible that the average member state perceives itself as losing in 
present value terms from the harmonization. Analytically, the issue is first, whether starting 
from scratch a harmonized federal code would be superior to adopting the spectrum of codes 
across the member states. But, second, given that the spectrum is in place, would the superior 
benefits of the harmonized federal code justify the costs entailed in adjusting institutions to 
the new code. 
6. Some Conclusions  
 The EU is considering a constitution. One major class of issues to consider is 
restrictions on the powers of EU federal institutions. In turn, a major question is the extent to 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Article 2, Section 2: “The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States 
and the Militia of the several States when called into service of the United States … 
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which it is prudent to allow federal institutions to compel harmonization of economic laws, 
regulations, and rules across member states. This paper looks at two concrete instances, 
harmonization of tax rates, and harmonization of commercial codes. In both instances, U.S. 
practice is a combination of some federal harmonization, but with a good deal of 
heterogeneity across states. On theoretical grounds, tax harmonization in the EU can be 
expected to set tax rates for the EU that are too high compared to other countries, and thus 
damage the EU in international competition. This suggests that it may be prudent for an EU 
constitution to include stringent limits on the power of federal institutions to impose tax 
harmonization.  
 The matter is less clear with harmonization of commercial codes. On the one hand, a 
federal commercial code that is uniform across member states reduces transaction and 
information costs, compared to leaving important code issues to member states. Further, many 
states may keep codes for long periods that are sub-optimal compared to a given federal code; 
states cannot be counted on to rapidly adopt what is best practice. On the other hand, there are 
some subtle costs that may be important and are likely to be missed. A federal code may, 
however, fit poorly with other institutions of member states, causing potentially large costs. 
Leaving codes to the states leads to competition across states, and may generate forces for 
change for the better. Competition also generates information about the effectiveness and 
costs of different commercial codes. Because any initial code is likely to be sub-optimal, and 
is likely to become less optimal over time, information on how to improve codes is valuable. 
Likely it is easier to learn and adapt from member states than from other countries.  
 More generally, the EU and the U.S. have great authority in the area of police 
powers, but the EU has much less authority in the area of defense and foreign policies and 
much less authority to extract taxes from EU citizens. For the health of the EU, a new EU 
constitution may well put strong explicit limitations on any growth in EU taxing powers and 
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EU control over defense and foreign policies. Further, likely the EU’s ability to exercise 
police powers should be reduced and limited by explicit grants of power in some areas, with 
all other powers reserved to the member states. In all three cases, these suggestions follow 
from the effects of EU power on the goodwill that its citizens have towards it. Generalized 
resentment by citizens translates into a diminished pool of the goodwill that the EU needs to 
function smoothly, indeed to function successfully. In the limit, resentment can grow so 
massive that citizens turn to talk of secession and even act on this talk. Of course, the U.S. 
federal government experiences the same type of resentment, and citizens are skeptical of 
federal policies, but there appears to be little sentiment for secession.   
 The analysis above suggests that a EU constitution might well put explicit 
limitations on the police powers that the EU can exercise. Police powers include regulation of 
economic and social relations, public health, public morals and crime. These police powers 
reach deep into the life of citizens, and EU exercise of police powers is a main source of 
resentment that citizens of many countries feel against the EU. Based on experience with the 
expansion of the EU’s exercise of police powers, it appears that the EU is likely to be ever 
more deeply involved in the lives of its citizens, and that its citizens are likely to become 
increasingly resentful. It is not at all clear that EU citizens benefit on net by increasing 
federalization of police powers at the EU level.  
 When the Framers wrote the U.S. Constitution in 1787, it was clear to most of them, 
and to a majority of U.S. citizens, that defense and foreign policies had to be federalized. The 
alternatives were too dangerous and unsatisfactory. In the twenty-first century, there is a great 
deal of dispute over federal exercise of its powers over defense and foreign policies. These 
disputes are nothing new; most major U.S. policies have had many domestic opponents. 
Nevertheless, there is little sentiment for reducing federal powers over defense and foreign 
policies, just for redirecting their use in one case or another. Some think that interventions 
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such as Somalia and Haiti are misguided. Many opposed the Iraq War. Some hope to get 
better policy outcomes by giving more power to Congress, less to the president, but few hope 
substantially to reduce those powers. Some want to spend less on defense, and use the saved 
funds elsewhere; the argument generally turns on cutting waste in defense programs, rather 
than deliberately weakening defense. Similarly, many would have the U.S. run a more 
isolationist policy—unilateralism with significantly reduced activity. Some would have the 
U.S. run an activist policy, but one that was approved by allies and international institutions—
multilateral activism.  
 The EU has a much wider range of choices than the U.S. in how much to federalize 
power in the defense and foreign policy areas. At present, the EU cannot force member states 
to speak with one voice in foreign policies or to act with one will in defense policies. Many 
EU citizens are satisfied with the current arrangements. Many, however, seek to have the EU 
exercise greater powers in defense and foreign policies. In the limit, many foresee the EU as a 
whole having only one foreign policy, and perhaps only one defense policy (with some opt-
outs). For the present, and likely for a very long time, there is not enough homogeneity in 
opinions across EU member states for strong federalization of defense and foreign policies to 
be a healthy idea. In the early twenty-first century, many suggested that the EU should 
boycott Israel, and some argued a boycott should be a mandatory action that all member states 
must adhere to. Such a boycott could not be imposed and enforced now, but many look 
forward to a day when the EU would have such power. Coercing reluctant states and their 
citizens into following a boycott that they oppose would put great pressures on the EU. For 
many, it might become a matter of principle over which they would be willing to break up the 
EU than compromise. Of course, an EU war that had great dissent across member states 
would be even more likely to strain or fracture the EU.   
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 To a federal bureaucrat, all problems tend to look like federal problems. In many 
cases, however, member states do not perceive federal solutions imposed on them as better 
than allowing states to go their own way. In such cases, federalization reduces the reservoir of 
good will on which the federation’s successful functioning depends. This depletion is an 
externality that federal bureaucrats do not take into account in their decisions on how far to 
push harmonization. One solution is to impose constitutional limits on the extent to which 
federal institutions can impose harmonization.  
 Note that limits on federal powers to require harmonization are not the same thing as 
limits on the powers of government to intervene in the economy. Strict limits on federal 
powers are consistent with substantial economic intervention by individual member states. 
Indeed, in the formative period of the U.S., from say 1780 to 1800, states were quite active in 
the economy in the form of protection, subsidies and regulations, and this was viewed as 
normal.     
Isaiah Berlin (2002) discusses two concepts of liberty. In the first, liberty consists of 
the individual’s right to have a say in what his/her government does, in particular, what the 
government does to him/her. In the second, liberty consists of the individual’s right to areas of 
private activity where the government has no say, or a limited say, over what the individual 
does.  
Americans conceded powers to their colonial governments and then to their state 
governments that they would not concede to a central government. At the same time, 
Americans conceded only limited powers to colonial and then state legislatures, under the 
second concept of liberty. The Americans insisted on both forms of liberty. Representative 
government ensured the individual had a say in what the government did, the first meaning of 
liberty. Government limited by a written constitution that enumerated its powers, with the rest 
restricted to the states or the people, ensured that there existed areas of private activity where 
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the federal government had no or limited say, the second meaning of liberty. All of the EU 
member states have constitutional guarantees for their citizens to participate in governing 
themselves, and these states thus ensure their citizens liberty in the first meaning. Giving 
citizens of EU states indirect representation in EU decision-making may formally solve the 
problem of “democratic deficits.” It does not, however, solve the problem that citizens 
demand guarantees of liberty in the second meaning. In federal systems, explicit 
constitutional limits on the federal government are one means for guaranteeing liberty in the 
second meaning.        
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Table 1. Federal Government Civilian Employment 
 
Year  Total  DC All Others  Post Office Population1 DC/ PO/   All Others/ 
         Total All Others Population 4 
 
1970  2,981,574 327,369 2,654,205 741,216  203.302  .1098 .2793  1.303 % 
 
1881  100,020  13,124    86,896  56,421    50.189  .1312 .6493  0.173 % 
 
1871    51,020    6,222    44,798  36,696    38.558  .1220 .8191  0.132 % 
1861    36,672    2,199    34,473  30,269    31.443  .0600 .8780  0.110 
1851    26,274    1,533    24,741  21,391    23.191  .0584 .8646  0.107 
 
1816     4,837        535      4,302    3,341     8.439 2  .1106 .7766  0.052 % 5 
 
1804      2,267       293      1,974  NA     6.274 3  .1293 NA  0.032 % 6 
 
 
 
 
1 In millions. For1970, 1880, 1870, 1860, 1850, 1820 and 1810, 1810 and 1800.  
2  Population is average of those for 1810 and 1820 (7.239 million and 9.638 million). 
3  Population is average of those for 1800 and 1810 (5.308 million and 7.239 million).   
4  In percent.   
5 Average of ratios using populations for 1810 and 1820 (0.0446 and 0.0594).     
6 Average of ratios using populations for 1800 and 1810 (0.02726 and 0.03719). 
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